My last name is Calle, which means ‘Street’ in Spanish. This is a piece about narrative street. Ergo, ‘Narrative Calle.’
The popular notion of contract-year motivation spans all team-based sports and disregards a variety of influential factors impacting one’s performance. While the opportunity of a large payday should theoretically incentivize players in the last year of their deal, the success of a select few – namely Knowshon Moreno in 2013 and DeMarco Murray in 2014 – amplifies and perpetuates the narrative.
Literature Review
Based on extensive research, increased contract-year performance is universally regarded as a myth.
Jonathan Bales’ 2012 study presented conclusive results that players performed similarly in the two years prior to their final year as they did in their contract year based on fantasy points per game. Seven months later, his follow-up article confirmed his findings: Only seven of the top-21 contract-year players in 2012 outperformed their two-year averages.
Mark Morales-Smith’s analysis on contract-year players from 2010 to 2014 concluded the following:
There are just way too many variables to give a definitive answer to the question. Especially an answer that just blankets all players. The evidence we do have would lead us to believe the contract year is trivial, bordering on irrelevant.
Chris Harris further debunked the narrative in 2015:
While the numbers I’ve reported here may indicate a gentle upward drift in the average performance of good players in contract years, there are way too many players whose performances drop off to proclaim any kind of real victory.
Ben Singer provided the most thorough research on the topic so far. In his analysis, spanning 2001 to 2012, he noted:
Age and head-coaching changes each appear to take their toll on player performance, but there isn’t any evidence that players improve their performance significantly in their contract year. Ultimately, it still doesn’t seem like there is evidence to support the notion that the contract year phenomenon exists in the NFL.
Now that we know it’s a sham, how does that affect our DFS decision-making process? The answer to such a question is rarely definitive, but we possess the tools to test the DFS production of contract-year players and potentially reveal exploitable trends.
Approach
Over the past two seasons, quarterbacks supplied a -2.10 Plus/Minus on 38.4 percent Consistency on FanDuel. It’s the only site and position combination to dip below a 0.00 Plus/Minus – the constant for every other pairing. We’ll use a neutral Plus/Minus as the baseline for this exercise.
FF Toolbox provided the list of 2015 and 2016 free agents. Each player was vetted using Spotrac contract information and cross-referenced in the event of a potential release or extension. If an individual was either released with years remaining on the contract or they signed a contract extension prior to their final season, they were excluded. For example, the Browns released running back Ben Tate 13 weeks into the 2014 season, less than nine months after inking him to a two-year deal, and Russell Wilson escaped the wooing process by signing a contract extension last summer. As such, both players were eliminated from consideration. Three types of free agents met the requirements: Early Rights, Restricted, and Unrestricted. The majority of the player pool consisted of unrestricted free agents.
Quarterbacks
| DraftKings | FanDuel | |||||
| Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | |
| 2014 | -4.85 | 25.4% | 118 | -4.56 | 25.9% | 116 |
| 2015 | -3.93 | 31.9% | 135 | -4.59 | 24.8% | 133 |
Competent organizations lock up franchise quarterbacks before they hit the open market. Cam Newton’s recent extension won’t let him test free agency until 2021. Aaron Rodgers will enter free agency for the first time in 2020 unless the Packers ink him to a third contract extension or release him. Veterans Tom Brady, Eli Manning, Philip Rivers, and Ben Roethlisberger have yet to compete under the final year of their deal.
In 2014, Mark Sanchez was the only quarterback on the last year of his deal to deliver a positive Plus/Minus on DraftKings and FanDuel while starting at least six games. He replaced an injured Nick Foles in Week 9, and even though they both averaged the same fantasy points per game in the same offensive scheme, Sanchez’s highest salary on FanDuel never exceeded Foles’ lowest price. At the end of the season, Sanchez re-signed with the Eagles to remain the backup and has only started two games since. That accurately depicts 2014’s quarterback class.
Out of 23 players in 2015, only Kirk Cousins and Ryan Fitzpatrick supplied a positive Plus/Minus on DraftKings and FanDuel. Both will run it back again this season – Cousins under the franchise tag and Fitzpatrick on a one-year deal. When excluding quarterbacks with less than seven starts, Consistency on both sites rose nearly 10 percent and the Plus/Minus score approached baseline levels.
Running Backs
| DraftKings | FanDuel | |||||
| Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | |
| 2014 | -0.62 | 31.8% | 522 | -0.23 | 31.7% | 514 |
| 2015 | -0.04 | 34.7% | 455 | -0.33 | 31.7% | 422 |
In 2014, five of the top-10 running backs in average Plus/Minus played in their contract year. Justin Forsett burst onto the scene to lead all backs with a +5.64 Plus/Minus on FanDuel, while C.J. Spiller sputtered through injuries, averaging 0.8 fewer yards per carry than the year prior. The difference in DFS production between the entire class and those who started at least seven games was negligible.
In 2015, running backs nearly turned myth into reality on DraftKings. Lamar Miller, Doug Martin, and James Starks all played 16 games and supplied a Plus/Minus of at least +3.20. Relying on our arbitrary threshold of at least seven games played, running backs on DraftKings recorded a +0.10 Plus/Minus. Unsurprisingly, when filtering out all the running backs with less than 10 games, the Plus/Minus jumped to +0.33 and Consistency rose to 37 percent, surpassing the baseline running back. Among that small subset of contract-year players, the median-priced tailbacks provided the most DFS success and the two bookend salary intervals offered negative returns.
I’m left with a question: Was 2015 a fluke or are organizations consciously overworking running backs on the last year of their deal without any intention of re-signing them? Perhaps I’m misdiagnosing the situation, but Miller, Chris Ivory, and Matt Forte all signed with new clubs in the offseason. Assuming running backs are replaceable and dependent on scheme and offensive line play, what effect does the end of their contract have on carries and workload? It may have been a factor, but with only two seasons of data, all I can do is pose the question.
Wide Receivers
| DraftKings | FanDuel | |||||
| Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | |
| 2014 | -0.69 | 33.0% | 555 | -0.54 | 31.1% | 530 |
| 2015 | -0.71 | 33.7% | 558 | -0.51 | 33.5% | 526 |
The receiving corp has been the most consistent year-to-year. Removing receivers who weren’t able to compete in at least six games minimally impacted the Plus/Minus and Consistency. While both metrics improved, the difference remained trivial. This is most notable in 2014 when only six of the 42 impending free agents played fewer than seven games.
In both seasons, receivers on the final year of their deal failed to land inside the top 15 in average Plus/Minus, and in 2015, only Alshon Jeffery – currently playing this season under the franchise tag – finished in the top 23 in average points per game on FanDuel and DraftKings. He was responsible for nine of the 11 most-expensive salaries on DraftKings and the top-nine prices on FanDuel among his class.
Tight Ends
| DraftKings | FanDuel | |||||
| Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | Plus/Minus | Consistency | Count | |
| 2014 | -0.71 | 30.5% | 256 | -0.56 | 29.2% | 250 |
| 2015 | -0.73 | 28.1% | 427 | -0.72 | 27.3% | 366 |
In 2014, only three tight ends on the last year of their deal offered Consistency greater than 50 percent. Seven of the 27 contract-year tight ends in 2014 were only able to garner a one-year deal, rolling over into the 2015 class and infecting the overall fantasy production an additional season.
In 2015, contract-year tight ends priced no higher than $3,000 on DraftKings accounted for 370 out of the 427 games, and their projected ineptitude resulted in a -1.56 Plus/Minus on 21.1 percent Consistency. Tight ends worth more than $3,000 in the final year of their deal countered with a +4.64 Plus/Minus on 73.7 percent Consistency. Gary Barnidge, Antonio Gates, and Ben Watson all contributed 81.0 percent Consistency on DraftKings and accounted for 32 of the 36 instances of a tight end costing at least $3,500. A similar salary divide transpired on FanDuel.
Barnidge played so well that the Browns rewarded him with a three-year contract extension during Week 14 of the 2015 NFL season, a la Rod Tidwell in Jerry Maguire. He led all tight ends with a +6.15 Plus/Minus on FanDuel and +7.85 Plus/Minus on DraftKings, and his production didn’t waver post-extension.
2016 Contract-Year Players
Alshon Jeffery and Drew Brees headline a fraction of the players entering the 2016 season on the final year of their contract. On the whole, we should expect diminishing returns based on well-researched literature and the finding of this article. However, in a weekly game like NFL DFS, matchups, role, and pricing will dictate expectation and production.
On a case-by-case basis, someone like Emmanuel Sanders doesn’t possess stability at the quarterback position, whereas Latavius Murray has one of the most heralded offensive lines and stable volume situations in the league. Veterans like Vincent Jackson and Darren Sproles are 33 years old and will play for a new head coach in a new scheme, while suspended Le’Veon Bell and a slimmed-down Eddie Lacy will suit up for the same coach and system in their fourth season.
Conclusion
Every position experienced a cumulative negative Plus/Minus on both FanDuel and DraftKings over the past two seasons in the final year of their contract. The quarterbacks offered the worst return on investment, potentially linked to inferior options reaching the end of their contract before an extension was met. Running backs almost confirmed the contract-year phenomenon in 2015. Wide receivers have been the most consistent, and tight ends have been buoyed by the elite options.
Production could be affected by any number of factors — players on the last year of their deal lacking the requisite talent to warrant extensions, stars subconsciously playing conservatively in order to minimize injury risk heading into free agency, or a new coaching staff overhauling the playbook and minimizing the role of a specific skill position. Even if the prevailing narrative revolves around psychological factors increasing performance, relying on individuals in the final year of their contract doesn’t appear to be a sound strategy in the DFS landscape.
